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LWX-002-922

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LWX-002-922

22 September 1945

To: SAINT, WASHINGTON
From: SAINT, GERMANY
Subject: United States Group Control Council Interrogation
report of SCHELLENBERG

1. Attached is an Interrogation report of SCHELLENBERG made by Maj. NICHOL, of the office of the Director of Intelligence United States Group Control Council, presumably when SCHELLENBERG was in custody at United States Forces European Theater.

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SCI DETACHMENT
BERLIN.

18 Sept 1945

MEMO:

TO : Chief, SMI, Germany.

Attached herewith is the interrogation report
of Walter SCHULLENBERG.

F.H. Johnson

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U.S. GROUP COUNCIL
(Germany)
APO 742

Office of the Director of Intelligence

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Auth: CG.100000
Initials: TSI/VI
Date: 31 July 45

31 July 1945

MEMORANDUM : Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch.

SUBJECT : Alleged Break of U.S. Diplomatic Code.

1. Pursuant to your instructions, the undersigned interrogated THE SCHILLBERG, former Chief of Amt VI, BERNA, regarding a statement made by SCHILLBERG in previous interrogation to the effect that the German Government had succeeded in breaking the United States diplomatic code used for transmissions between BERNA and WASHINGTON. Present also at the interrogation were Captain Benjamin SCHWARTZ, C-908870, SC and Captain Charles R. LEMANICK, C-453795, SC, both of Signal Security Detachment WPA, SIO, ATO, APO 655. The interrogation was conducted in English and partly in German.

2. SCHILLBERG stated that in early 1943 the U.S. diplomatic code in use between BERNA and WASHINGTON had been broken, as well as the one used for transmission from WASHINGTON to BERNA. To the best of his knowledge, this was the only United States code broken; however, at about the same time the Germans had also broken all or most of the codes used by the Balkan countries, namely, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey. As to the last mentioned, the Turkish code, SCHILLBERG thought that it had been obtained by stealing a copy, photographing it and returning the stolen copy. In addition, these means were able to break codes used by certain Polish Resistance Stations in Egypt, Sweden and elsewhere.

3. SCHILLBERG stated that while he received highly classified reports on the interception of BERNA - WASHINGTON diplomatic communications, their subject matter was of little or no interest to him, as it was devoted largely to an American appraisal of conditions in Germany.

With respect to other enemy codes, SCHILLBERG stated that this work was done, in part, by our agencies, as follows:

- a. OKW
- b. FHECHUNGSAMT
- c. FOREIGN OFFICE
- d. NAVY

Other offices, SCHILLBERG stated, knew little. He has heard of the Navy office as being in BERNAU and later in FLOAN, near KIEL. The Foreign Office had a small department which worked on codes and which he believed moved to KITCHENHILL late in the war. The radio intercept office was also at SCHILLBERG not aware of its reports. The FHECHUNGSAMT was first in BERNAU and later in

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(SCHALLENBERG interrogation)

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KAUFRAUHN, DAVENIA. In the early days, the relationship between Amt VI and the Forschungsamt was poor but it was later improved through the efforts of SCHALLENBERG. The principal code breaks, SCHALLENBERG thought, were through Army efforts and the OKW office, which was under Gen. GIMMEL, Gen. THIEME and OBST KATTLER, who appears to have been the really important person in that line. KATTLER, whose name SCHALLENBERG could not recall and whom he last saw in February, was known to the latter through Mr. WILLY SCHMITZ of HUSSOLDORF, who was SCHALLENBERG's personal assistant and who was later at FLENSBURG with HEINICH. SCHMITZ and KATTLER were personal friends. KATTLER and mostly civilian technicians in his office because they could be paid more than military personnel and hence higher-grade skill could be obtained. SCHALLENBERG made available to KATTLER additional funds from sources available to him, which funds were used to pay the technicians' salaries. KATTLER packed up his office in HALL late in the war and probably moved southward. SCHALLENBERG said KATTLER had most probably been picked up by the Americans.

5. Among KATTLER's assistants was a man whose name SCHALLENBERG could not recall although this man's brother had worked for SCHALLENBERG himself. KATTLER's assistant was described as a Baltic who spoke perfect Russian.

6. SCHALLENBERG apparently received a lot of his information on code matters from KATTLER. KATTLER told him that two Russian codes had been purchased from the Finns (probably about March 1945) via Stockholm; however these codes were lost and their actual value was never really estimated.

7. With respect to Japanese codes SCHALLENBERG stated that KATTLER had also done research. In reply to the question of whether information on code breaks, especially the WASHINGTON-BOMBING break, had been passed to the Japanese, SCHALLENBERG stated that he did not think so. He did state that he believed that the Germans were able to read the Japanese diplomatic code.

8. SCHALLENBERG stated that the FUNKHOFFMANNST had done good work on purely military codes and battlefield transmissions. He claimed that during the battle of N. Germany the Germans had been able to cut in on some English transmissions and that they had also been able to tap the Russian radio telephone key which furnished good electronic information since reports from all areas in Russia were directed to Moscow and these reports were accordingly tapped by the Germans. Gen. THIEME told SCHALLENBERG that up to 1942 the Germans had been able to cut in on the CAIRO - LONDON transmissions; however, in 1942 a new encoding machine was introduced and the Germans had not been able to break

9. SCHALLENBERG stated that a civilian, one OBERGSTRAT VETTERLIN, had set up a device near FLENSBURG whereby he was able to tap trans-Atlantic telephone conversations. Excerpts from these taps were sent by teletype to SCHALLENBERG but did not prove

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(SCHELLENBERG Interrogation)

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very useful and could only be evaluated in the light of later events. Early in 1944 SCHELLENBERG went to EINDHOVEN and listened in to a telephone conversation between CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT, a matter which was of great pride to VETTERLEIN. SCHELLENBERG believes that VETTERLEIN removed all his equipment from EINDHOVEN perhaps to BERLIN or HALLE but does not know what became of it.

10. SCHELLENBERG's information on code breaks seemed to be largely second-hand and he was not familiar with the technical details. From his statements, the information so obtained was probably not of very great importance to his particular work. He gave the impression of being most willing to talk and was apparently anxious to give to all questions as complete answers as his knowledge permitted.

THOMAS NICHOL, JR.
Major, FA

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